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Abstract
Errors due to hardware or low level software problems, if detected, can be fixed by vari-
ous schemes, such as recomputation from a checkpoint. Silent errors are errors in application
state that have escaped low-level error detection. At extreme scale, where machines can per-
form astronomically many operations per second, silent errors threaten the validity of computed
results.
We propose a new paradigm for detecting silent errors at the application level. Our central
idea is to frequently compare computed values to those provided by a cheap checking computation,
and to build error detectors based on the difference between the two output sequences. Numerical
analysis provides us with usable checking computations for the solution of initial-value problems
in ODEs and PDEs, arguably the most common problems in computational science. Here, we
provide, optimize, and test methods based on Runge-Kutta and linear multistep methods for
ODEs, and on implicit and explicit finite difference schemes for PDEs. We take the heat
equation and Navier-Stokes equations as examples. In tests with artificially injected errors, this
approach effectively detects almost all meaningful errors, without significant slowdown.
1 Silent errors and checking schemes
1.1 Silent errors are worrisome
Computational scientists are concerned about silent errors in exascale computing. Silent errors
are perturbations to application state that may lead to a failure such as a bad final solution
[Snir et al., 2013]. These errors may arise from a bit flip, a firmware bug, data races, and other
causes. Several authors ([Cappello et al., 2009, Dongarra et al., 2011, Snir et al., 2013]) have dis-
cussed the sources and the frequency of silent errors.
Why the current concern? An exaflop machine will be able to do on the order of 1023 operations
per day, and will have on the order of 1017 bytes of memory [Dongarra et al., 2011]. And in order to
achieve very aggressive energy efficiency and performance targets, machine architects are pushing
envelopes: with near threshold voltage logic, with new memory and storage technologies, and with
photonic communication. Consumer quality hardware may already suffer errors at the personal
computer scale once per year [Nightingale et al., 2011], and cost precludes really significant hard-
ening of the hardware in supercomputers. Thus, the scale of systems makes such errors quite likely.
Indeed, some high-performance systems today already suffer from silent errors at a troublesome
rate [Shi et al., 2009].
1.2 Algorithmic responses to silent errors
The numerical algorithms community has already looked at error vulnerability. It is well known
that many errors do not cause failures. Other errors lead to an obvious application failure. Silent
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errors are more worrisome, because they can cause unsuspected erroneous outputs. Our goal is to
make these errors non-silent.
It has been argued that with extra care, convergent iterations are inherently self-correcting;
for example, a resilient version of GMRES is proposed in [Hoemmen and Heroux, 2011]. Other
empirical studies have shown, however, that iterative methods are sometimes vulnerable to errors
[Bronevetsky and de Supinski, 2008, Casas et al., 2012]. And in a study of a minimization approach
to Hartree-Fock ground state calculation, Van Dam, et al., found that “it is insufficient to rely on the
algorithmic properties of the Hartree-Fock method to correct all the possible bit-flips and resulting
data corruption” [van Dam et al., 2013]. Sufficiently big errors can be fatal to these algorithms.
Minimization and equation solving (in which the data defining the function or equation are
assumed to be incorruptible) is an easy case, since the residual of the current approximate solution
almost surely does not lie. But in many cases in computational science, a time-dependent, initial
value problem is solved. In these cases, any perturbation to the computed solution puts that
solution onto a permanently erroneous track. We therefore take the view that error detection is
a fundamental issue, and that errors, detected as soon as they occur, can then be handled by an
appropriate correction scheme.
Certain common kernels have been fortified with error detectors. For example, checksum
methods have been used for matrix multiplication [Huang and Abraham, 1984], high performance
LU [Du et al., 2012], and checking the integrity of data replicated on multiple compute nodes
[van Dam et al., 2013]. This latter paper also monitored a number of theoretical invariants of
the algorithm. Orthogonality of a matrix can be checked by multiplying by its transpose, for exam-
ple. Conservation laws can be monitored, where available, as a check for error. These monitoring
approach were found to be useful, but fallible; they are not a comprehensive safety net.
1.3 Our approach
In this paper, we propose a very general, low-cost error detection approach that applies to iterative
computations in general, and to the solution of initial value problems for ODEs and PDEs in
particular. Our central idea is to compare the solution given by a primary, or base time stepping
scheme to the solution given by an auxiliary checking scheme, and to do this every time step. The
two schemes use the same input data, all of it computed by the base scheme: thus the auxiliary
solution is used only locally, at each time step, to check for errors. This approach has compelling
advantages over a straightforward duplication of the computation – it is cheaper, and it can detect
problems that duplication cannot.
Error is a constant in scientific computing. Even with no bugs or failures, we have modeling er-
ror, truncation error, and roundoff error. To deal with truncation error, schemes of the kind we are
proposing have long been employed for automatic step size control in ODE solvers [Fehlberg, 1969].
Similar a posteriori error estimators are used for mesh adaptation in PDE solvers [Berger and Oliger, 1984].
The idea is to make a numerical method introspective, aware of and watchful for errors. Our con-
tribution is to extend these powerful schemes so that they can be used to detect errors due to a
misbehaving computing system as well.
Suitable checking schemes are available in the most common setting – the solution of initial-
value problems in ODEs and PDEs. A full description of the general approach, including the
key question of how we trigger notification of an error, is given in the next section. We describe
specific checking schemes for Runge-Kutta and linear multistep methods in Section 3.1 and for
finite difference methods for the heat equation in Section 3.2. We discuss the error detector, and
an approach to controlling and optimizing it, in Section IV.
In tests with artificially injected errors, we measure the impact of errors by how much they
impact the solution. We quantify this idea in Section 5.1, and we then show through numerical
experiments that our detection scheme effectively catches errors that have a significant impact on
the solution.
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2 Outline of general method
Suppose there are two iterative methods to solve a problem, a base method, B, and an auxiliary
checking method, A. One would use B in a computing environment with no errors. Desirable
properties of B are therefore accuracy and stability. A suitable auxiliary A solves the same problem
– its output can be compared to that of B. And it can be used at each iteration, using the same
input data as does B. The key idea is that the norm of the difference between the results provided
by A and B is an estimator of the magnitude of the difference at the current step between B and
an error-free solution. That suggests that A should have accuracy comparable to (or even better
than) B. For efficiency, we want A to be fast when used as a check on B, possibly by reusing some
of the computations, communications, and input data of B. Since we do not use A in a closed-loop
setting (i.e., A does not use its own results as input at each step), stability is not really important
in A. This gives us useful freedom in choosing auxiliary schemes.
The two schemes produce sequences of values {Ai} and {Bi} in the same normed vector space.
For any norm or seminorm of the difference, we have a scalar sequence, Di = ‖Ai − Bi‖. We may
choose to use more than one such metric, so in general, Di may be a vector.
Our methods employ, at each step n, a window into the sequence (Dn−d, . . . , Dn), as data for an
error detection function E(Dn−d, . . . , Dn) that decides whether or not to raise the flag for an error.
The error detector typically employs one or more measures of size, or more powerfully measures of
anomaly, to the value Dn in the context of its recent values Dn−d, . . . , Dn−1. In general, then, a
method includes base and checking computation schemes, a vector of difference measures, and an
error detection criterion.
2.1 Choosing an auxiliary scheme
Let us first consider the simplest case, and show why it does not help us; this motivates the search
for better auxiliary schemes.
Consider A to be the same as B, i.e., A just repeats the computation. The error detector simply
flags an error whenever B and A differ, or differ by more than a small multiple of machine precision.
Here A is not fast (it costs the same as B). Moreover, it won’t catch certain errors: if the input
data for the step are corrupted (after successful previous steps write these data to memory), the
two computations produce identical, incorrect results. The same is true if a computation unit fails
in a repeatable manner – a stuck-at fault, for example – or a communicated value corrupted by the
network is used by both schemes.
A better checking scheme is one that reuses some of the computation and communication of the
base scheme (for efficiency), but is different in a way that makes the two schemes disagree unless
there are no errors anywhere in the algorithm.
Two examples, covered in detail below, are embedded Runge-Kutta schemes, in which A reuses
evaluations of the derivative function that are needed for B, and paired linear multistep methods,
in which saved and new values of the solution and its time derivative are combined in two different
ways to estimate the solution at the next time step. Notably, for stiff ODEs and second-order
parabolic PDEs, stability mandates the use of implicit base schemes, with their attendant algebraic
system to solve at each time step, but explicit schemes prove to be effective, inexpensive auxiliaries.
2.2 The detector
The norm of the difference, Di = ‖Ai − Bi‖, is an obvious candidate for error checking. What
complicates this is that the size of Di can vary over orders of magnitude in the error-free case, as
the solution changes. Thus, a hard threshold is ineffective for error detection. Our view is that
a sudden change in the sequence {Di} better indicates that an error is present. We examine this
empirically in Section 5.
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At the core of the detector there will be comparisons of some scalar indicator quantities to
some thresholds. How should these thresholds be chosen? We take the following view. With any
sort of error detector, we can have false positives and false negatives, and there is an intrinsic
tradeoff between their rates: a low threshold boosts the rate of false positives but misses few true
errors; a high threshold reduces the false positive rate at the expense of more missed errors. In our
setting, false negatives are bad, but false positives are only mildly annoying. We will propose below
strategies that tend to maintain a constant and sufficiently small false positive rate, while reducing
the false negative rate to very low levels.
2.3 What to do if an error is flagged
What do we expect an application to do if an error is detected? This is not the topic of our work,
but we feel it’s important to give an idea of a general scheme.
Before implementing any error recovery scheme for an iterative method, there are two important
questions to ask when a flag is raised to indicate an error:
1. On what iteration could the error have occurred?
2. What data or computation was affected by the fault?
We then intend to redo the failed steps (Question 1) by redoing all potentially failed computations
(Question 2).
How far back must we go? In our numerical experiments, we see that in quite a few cases the
time step after the one in which the fault occurred causes the error flag to be raised. For example,
a small error in a derivative evaluation in a linear multistep method may produce a large error in
a few time steps, since the derivative evaluation gets re-used for several iterations. Thus, we first
have to establish which iterations may be erroneous and which ones we still trust.
For example, suppose the base and checking schemes use the solutions at the previous two time
steps to compute the solution at the next. Futher suppose that this pair of schemes sometimes
flags an error one iteration after the faulty step. Consider now that our procedure flags iteration 5,
signalling there might be an error. We cannot trust the solution at step 4, but we can trust step 3
because, were it faulty, we would have seen a flag at iteration 3 or 4. Hence, we go back and restart
the computation of iteration 4, using the stored data from iterations 2 and 3.
We hope and expect that silent errors will be rare. Even with a small false positive rate, there
will be more false positives than true positives. It is important to not get stuck and redo (correct)
computations over and over again when they are incorrectly flagged. In order to avoid this we
propose a taxonomy of possibilities.
1. The error may have been caused by a transient fault. On retry, if the fault does not recur,
we will likely succeed, with no error flag.
2. The error may have been caused by a permanent fault that causes erratic, irreproducible
behavior.
3. First, if data in memory have been corrupted, silently, we may discover this with our scheme.
If we redo the failed steps starting from the same corrupted in-memory data, we expect an
identical outcome, with the error flag raised on the retry.
4. Second, if some hardware or software component has failed in a “hard” way, meaning it
consistently produces incorrect results, we expect again an identical outcome, with the error
flag raised on the retry.
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5. The error may be expected if, for example, the algorithm sacrifices correctness in rare sce-
narios for speed [Rinard, 2013]. If the algorithm fails randomly, but rarely (as is the case
in [Rinard, 2013]), re-computation will likely provide the correct answer. If the failure is
deterministic, then a different algorithm will be needed.
6. Or there may be no error at all; it may be that the problem’s local difficulty causes the error
flag to trigger, with the current value of the time step, in the error free case. Again, we expect
an identical result on retry.
As stated above, the first response to a flagged error is to go back to an iteration that was
computed with no error flags, or possibly one iteration further back, and redo the subsequent
iterations, including the error checks. We want also to check to see whether this recomputation
produces the same result as it did initially.
If retry succeeds with no error flag, we likely have discovered that an error of type (1) or (5)
occurred. We can report it, and continue.
If retry fails, but with a significantly different result that on the first try, it is likely that a
component of the platform has become unreliable; we need to change it. This is an error of type
(2).
If retry fails with the same computed result as initially, there is ambiguity: the cause may be
any of (3), (4), (5), or (6) above. Absent a way to tell, there is a problem.
Our approach is compatible with systems that protect memory contents from loss and cor-
ruption. All machines have a basic error detection and correction system for memory. These
can be augmented with additional protection and redundancy, as in the Global View Resilience
Project [Fujita et al., 2013]. In case of a reproducible flagged error, such a scheme can be invoked
to test the memory contents and see if they have been corrupted, to rule our an error of type (3),
or correct it if one has occurred.
If such a test detects no corruption of the input data to the failed step, then how can we
distinguish between errors of type (4) and (6)? Here we could go back to the origins of this
approach, and redo the computation with a smaller step – perhaps half the current step. If the
error is of type (6), this approach will, after a few reductions, fix the problem. But if the problem
remains after repeated step size reductions, we would suspect an error of type (4).
3 Applications
3.1 ODE solvers
Consider a first-order ODE initial-value problem:
d
dt
u(t) = f(t, u(t)), u(0) = u0. (1)
Suppose that we are using the explicit midpoint Runge-Kutta (RK) scheme as a base scheme B
to compute uBn+1 ≈ u(tn+1) in Equation (1):
kB1 = f(tn, u
B
n) (2a)
uBn+1 = u
B
n + hf(tn +
1
2
h, uBn +
1
2
hkB1 ). (2b)
The local truncation error (LTE) of this scheme is O (h3). We note that f(tn, uBn) is the central
computation in Euler’s method, which has LTE O (h2), and we use this to construct an auxiliary
scheme A,
uAn+1 = u
B
n + hk
B
1 .
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Figure 1: Difference between RK5 (B) and RK4 (A) over time for the van der Pol equation with b = 2 and
initial conditions u(0) = 1 and u′(0) = 0. An artificial error is injected at the 80-th iteration,
which results in the spike in D80. The red circles indicate iterations that are predicted to be
erroneous by our detection scheme; see Section 4.
An example difference computation is Dn+1 = ‖uBn+1 − uAn+1‖∞. By re-using uBN and kB1 , A
provides a cheap approximation to the solution. The midpoint and Euler schemes are an embedded
RK pair [Dormand and Prince, 1980]; these form the basis of adaptive step-size methods. In general,
we can use any embedded RK pair in the A/B formulation. A common, accurate scheme is the
RKF45 scheme due to Fehlberg [Fehlberg, 1969].
Figure 1 illustrates how errors lead to jumps in the difference between A and B using this
particular scheme for the Van der Pol equation
u′′(t)− b(1− u(t)2)u′(t) + u(t) = 0, (3)
whose rapid changes in derivatives make this a challenging case.
In Section 5, we show in more detail that errors in the evaluation of Equation (2a) or Equa-
tion (2b) can be effectively detected by RK-based A/B schemes. Moveover, we also show that errors
in the evaluation of f can be detected just as effectively, even if this wrong computation is used by
both methods. However, due to the memoryless property of RK methods, they cannot easily detect
changes to uBn . We discuss this matter and provide experiments in Section 5.2.
Linear multistep methods (LMM) are also amenable to our framework. An Adams-Bashforth
LMM (AB-LMM) of order p ≥ 1 computes uBn+1 ≈ u(tn+1) by
uBn+1 = u
B
n +
n∑
i=n−p+1
hαp,if(ti, u
B
i ),
such that the LTE is O (hp+1). Suppose that B is a p-th order AB-LMM, p ≥ 2. One choice
of A is the AB-LMM of order p − 1, which reuses the same data, stores no additional data, and
performs no additional evaluation of f . An alternative A is a linear multistep method of order p
that interpolates at (possibly multiple) uBk for k < n. However, additional memory is needed to
store solutions at prior time steps. In order to compare AB-LMM to RK methods, we will consider
the (p− 1, p) AB-LMM pairs in our experiments in Section 5.
Implicit numerical schemes are preferred for stiff ODEs. For example, an Adams-Moulton LMM
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Figure 2: Solution and difference sequence for Equation (4) with k = 1
100
, q(x, t) =
0.1 (sin(2pit) + cos(2pix)), v(x) = x(x − 1), ∆x = 1
160
, and ∆t = 1
100
. The difference func-
tion is Di = ‖Ai − Bi‖∞. A fault is injected at the 120-th time step by multiplying the 40-th
component of the right-hand-side of the linear solves used by Crank-Nicolson and backward Euler
by 0.995. The solution appears normal, but the difference sequence indicates an anomoly at the
120-th time step.
(AM-LMM) of order p defines un+1 implicitly, as the solution to the system of equations
uBn+1 = u
B
n +
n+1∑
i=n−p+2
hβp,if(ti, u
B
i ).
Its LTE is O (hp+1). Suppose that the base scheme B is an AM-LMM. The computationally
expensive part of the method is solving the (possibly nonlinear) equation for un+1. A lower-order
AM-LMM will require a different solve and is a less attractive choice for A (it will not be fast
compared to B). Instead, we can use an AB-LMM for A,
uAn+1 = u
B
n +
n∑
i=n−p+1
hαp,if(ti, u
B
i )
AB-LMM is an explicit method, but the starting value, uBn , and function evaluations, {f(ti, uBi )}n−p+1≤i≤n,
have been computed by the implicit AM-LMM. Thus, use of an AB-LMM as A does not suffer from
the instability of explicit methods used on stiff ODEs. Note that we can employ any implicit LMM
as a base scheme, including, for example, the backward differentiation formulas.
Finally, an explicit / implicit pair of LMMs is sometimes used in a predictor-corrector fashion.
Here, the implicit LMM’s equations are solved by a truncated fixed-point iteration in which the
explicit scheme generates a first iterate. In this instance, the auxiliary scheme (the predictor) is
already a part of the solution mechanism for the base scheme (the corrector), so it comes at no
extra cost.
3.2 PDE solvers
Due to the large variety of PDE solvers, we do not have a one-size-fits-all solution. For time-
dependent PDEs, a method of lines discretization in space results in a system of ODEs, and the
ODE methods described above can be employed. Here instead we consider finite difference schemes
for PDEs.
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To make this idea concrete, we will describe an A/B formulation for the heat equation. A more
detailed example (the incompressible Navier-Stokes equations) is provided in Section 5.6.
For a model problem, consider the nonhomogeneous heat equation
ut = kuxx + q(x, t), k > 0
u(x, 0) = v(x) (4)
with homogeneous Dirichlet boundary conditions. Suppose that B and A are the backward and
forward Euler schemes. Both methods have LTEs of O ((∆x)2) in space and O (∆t) in time. At
each time step, B solves a linear system, while A computes a matrix-vector product. Thus, we
expect A to be faster. Moreover, in the distributed memory setting, A requires no communication
other than what is done in scheme B, if B uses an iterative solver.
An alternative B is the Crank-Nicolson scheme, which is implicit and has LTEs of O ((∆x)2) in
space and O ((∆t)2) in time. Forward Euler is a candidate for A, but we desire an explicit method
with the same LTEs as Crank-Nicolson. The Richardson scheme (also known as the leapfrog scheme)
is such a method, and it uses a centered difference in time and space. While the Richardson scheme
reuses the computations from Crank-Nicolson, the centered difference in time requires the solution
at the two previous time steps. We refer to [Strikwerda, 2007, Section 6.3] for a discussion of all of
these methods.
Figure 2 plots the solution to the heat equation and the sequence of differences {Di = ‖Ai −
Bi‖∞} for a particular problem instance. An error occurs in the 120-th iteration and is exhibited
by a spike in the sequence of differences. In Section 5.3, we thoroughly examine how effective the
Richardson / Crank-Nicolson and forward / backward Euler A/B formulations are in detecting
errors.
3.3 Extrapolation
For some base schemes B, the choice of a related auxiliary A may not be obvious. But extrapolation
is always available, in the form of an LMM in which all the β terms are zero. The order 1 version
is simply
Ai = 2Bi−1 −Bi−2.
Although useless as basic solvers, extrapolation methods are usable for error detection. They are
cheap, and can have acceptable error characteristics. Extrapolation is part of the A/B scheme used
for the Navier-Stokes equations in Section 5.6.
4 Error detection
In this section we outline a practical implementation of the error detection function, E. Throughout
this section, we consider a scalar error metric D, for example the sup-norm of the difference between
A and B. Because the scale of the variations in D is unknown, and can be time varying, it is
important that E can handle errors independent of scale. We therefore use relatively large changes
in D as indicators of problems, rather than the magnitude of D itself.
To find iterations with errors, we use two indicator variables derived from the sequence of
differences Dn−p, . . . , Dn:
Jn =
Dn+1 −Dn
Dn
(5)
Vn =
Var(Dn−p+1, . . . Dn+1)
Var(Dn−p, . . . , Dn)
(6)
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Jn measures the jump in the sequence and Vn measures a change in variance. A large value for
either indicator signals that an error has occurred. The integer p adjusts the window size; in our
experiments, p = 10.
We flag an error only when both indicators exceed their current thresholds. We show in Sec-
tion 5.4 that the two-indicator strategy improves the sensitivity to actual errors for a fixed false
positive rate.
We use a closed-loop mechanism to tune the thresholds. We increase a threshold by the factor
Γ > 1 every time the indicator is above its threshold and decrease a threshold by a factor γ < 1 every
time the indicator is below its threshold. If both indicators are above their respective thresholds,
we flag an error and rely on an error handler as discussed in Section 2.3. The overall idea is in
Algorithm 1.
The closed-loop tuning procedure forces thresholds to be only slightly above typical values. In
practice, this reduces the probability of false negatives, without causing many false positives. In
our experiments in Section 5, Γ = 1.4, γ = 0.95, and p = 10. The detector’s performance is not
sensitive to these choices. We choose γ to be close to one so as to reduce the false positive rate.
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode for the error detection algorithm. We use adaptive error thresholding
to keep the false positive rate and false negative rate low.
procedure Resilient algorithm
Initialize thresholds τJ and τV
Initialize increase parameter Γ > 1.
Initialize decrease parameter γ < 1.
while n < N do
Bn+1 = BaseMethod()
An+1 = AuxiliaryMethod()
Dn+1 = ‖Bn+1 −An+1‖
// Compute indicators
Jn =
Dn+1−Dn
Dn
Vn =
Var(Dn−p+1,...Dn+1)
Var(Dn−p,...,Dn)
// Check for errors
if Jn > τJ and Vn > τV then
FlagError()
Move backward: n = n− x
else
UpdateThreshold(Jn, τJ )
UpdateThreshold(Vn, τV )
Move forward: n = n+ 1
end if
end while
end procedure
procedure UpdateThreshold(t, τ)
if t > τ then
τ = Γτ
else
τ = γτ
end if
end procedure
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4.1 Discussion
Our method relies on two assumptions:
• Methods B and A produce approximately the same result in the error-free case; that is, they
are accurate.
• Changes in the solution are not excessively rapid, so that the behavior of the difference
sequence is predictable in the error-free case.
When either of these assumptions is violated, we expect problems. For example, a discontinuity
in the derivative f in Equation (1) may cause consecutive iterations to vary wildly, and an error
will often be predicted. And indeed we may have detected an error: not one caused by an unstable
platform, but rather one due to underresolution. It is thus inherent in our approach that when the
solution changes rapidly, we may see false positives.
We note that sometimes an error is flagged one step after the iteration the error occurred. It is
therefore best to go back two iterations. We explore this phenomenon in Section 5.5.
Many more sophisticated statistical tools are available in time series analysis for outlier and
peak detection [Hamilton, 1994, Lin et al., 2003]. However, algorithms for peak detection are not
a focus of this paper, and the simple and fast approach outlined above performs well for several
practical examples in Section 5.
5 Numerical experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of several A/B formulations on a variety of problems.
We begin by outlining how we inject artificial faults in computations. Next, we elaborate on the
particular problem instances and how the detector performs. All experiments used Matlab R2013a.
5.1 Fault injection and LTE-normalized error
In our experiments, we inject faults by corrupting important computations or data, such as the
result of a function evaluation. We do not corrupt internal data structures or program logic. The
reason for this choice is that low-level errors in the program will likely either not be silent or will
have a similar effect to corrupting computations or data. The three ways we inject faults are as
follows:
1. Corrupt an evaluation of f , the derivative function in Equation (1) or an evaluation of q, the
source term in Equation (4).
2. Corrupt the right-hand-side when solving a system of linear equations before the solver is
used.
3. Corrupt a previous solution from the solver (most of our solvers use the solution from the
previous time step).
By “corrupt”, we mean multiply a single component of a vector or matrix by some amount. In
our experiments, we conduct many trials and multiply by a normally distributed random variable
with mean 1 and problem-dependent variance, σ2. This method avoids producing Infs and NaNs
that are produced by fault-injection methods such as bit flips. Such values are easily recognized
and flagged, so the errors are not silent.
Suppose that a fault is injected at iteration n− 1. In order to measure the impact of a fault on
the computed solution relative to the ordinary truncation errors of the numerical method, we use
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the value
Ln =
‖Bn − Bˆn‖
‖Bˆn − Aˆn‖
,
where Bˆn and Aˆn are the outputs of B and A when no fault is injected. The numerator measures
the magnitude of the impact of the fault on the base solution, and the denominator is an estimate
of the LTE. We call Ln the LTE-normalized error.
By measuring the LTE-normalized error, the type of error introduced in the experiments becomes
less important. Instead, we are able to see how detection varies with the error’s impact on the
solution. A small LTE-normalized error means that the error has relatively little influence on the
solution while a large LTE-normalized error means that the error has a large influence on the
solution. In the subsequent sections, we show that our detector effectively catches large LTE-
normalized errors but has difficulty catching small LTE-normalized errors. In practice, this is a
desirable property: errors that have a stronger impact on the solution are more easily detected.
Furthermore, it seems unreasonable to demand that errors of the order of local truncation error are
detected.
5.2 Van der Pol equation
Our first set of experiments uses the Van der Pol equation (Equation (3)). We will vary the damping
parameter b in our experiments but fix the intial conditions and time interval:
u(0) = 1, u′(0) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ] = [0, 14]
The van der Pol equation has rapid changes in derivatives, which makes it a difficult test problem
for our error detection scheme. Increasing b stiffens the problem and induces more rapid changes
in derivatives.
We test four A/B schemes: Runge-Kutta 4/5 (RK45), Runge-Kutta 2/3 (RK23), Adams-
Bashforth 4/5 (AB45), and Adams-Bashforth 2/3 (AB23). In the first set of experiments, we
corrupt one component of the derivative evaluations at some time step (σ2 = 1e-1). Runge-Kutta
uses four (RK23) or six (RK45) derivative evaluations per step, and the error corrupts one of these
evaluations. Adams-Bashforth uses one derivative evaluation per step, so the time step determines
the corrupted function evaluation. The erroneous time step, corrupted derivative component, and
erroneous evaluation in Runge-Kutta are chosen uniformly at random. We use 2,000 trials, where
a trial consists of an ODE solve at times 0, h, 2h, . . . , T . One error is introduced per trial. Finally,
we use two values of the damping parameter, b ∈ {2, 3}. For b = 2, the step sizes are 1/10 and
1/20 for the Runge-Kutta and Adams-Bashforth methods, respectively. For b = 3, the step sizes
are 1/15 and 1/35.
Figure 3 shows the true positive rate (TPR) as a function of the LTE-normalized error. The true
positive rate is the proportion of artificially injected errors detected by the detection scheme. We
use a kernel regression with a Gaussian kernel to fit the TPR to the LTE-normalized error. Each
plot shows the detection rate for both (1) detection at the time step of the fault and (2) detection
at the step of the fault or the step after. In all cases, we see the trend that large LTE-normalized
errors are easily detected while small LTE-normalized errors are more difficult to catch. Contrary
to RK45 and RK23, AB45 and AB23 detect many errors the step after the error occurs. This is not
entirely surprising. Runge-Kutta methods use the erroneous derivative evaluation once to advance
a time step, while Adams-Bashforth methods reuses the erroneous computation at the time step
of the fault and in following steps. Thus, there is more opportunity for the B and A schemes to
disagree in Adams-Bashforth methods. Finally, we note that, in general the higher-order schemes
(RK45 and AB45) exhibit slightly better performance than the lower order schemes (RK23 and
AB23).
11
100 101 102 103
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
LTE−normalized Error
Tr
ue
 p
os
itiv
e 
ra
te
AB23 on Van der Pol with h = 1 / 20, b = 2
 
 
Detected at step of fault
Detected at step or step after fault
100 101 102 103
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
LTE−normalized Error
Tr
ue
 p
os
itiv
e 
ra
te
AB45 on Van der Pol with h = 1 / 20, b = 2
100 101 102 103
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
LTE−normalized Error
Tr
ue
 p
os
itiv
e 
ra
te
AB23 on Van der Pol with h = 1 / 35, b = 3
100 101 102 103
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
LTE−normalized Error
Tr
ue
 p
os
itiv
e 
ra
te
AB45 on Van der Pol with h = 1 / 35, b = 3
100 101 102 103
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
LTE−normalized Error
Tr
ue
 p
os
itiv
e 
ra
te
RK23 on Van der Pol with h = 1 / 10, b = 2
100 101 102 103
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
LTE−normalized Error
Tr
ue
 p
os
itiv
e 
ra
te
RK45 on Van der Pol with h = 1 / 10, b = 2
100 101 102 103
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
LTE−normalized Error
Tr
ue
 p
os
itiv
e 
ra
te
RK23 on Van der Pol with h = 1 / 15, b = 3
100 101 102 103
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
LTE−normalized Error
Tr
ue
 p
os
itiv
e 
ra
te
RK45 on Van der Pol with h = 1 / 15, b = 3
Figure 3: Detector performance with RK45, RK23, AB45, and AB23 A/B schemes on the Van der Pol
equation. We corrupt a single derivative evaluation at the current time step by multiplying one
component of the evaluation by a normal random variable with mean 1 and variance 1e-1. The
same sequence of corruption amounts (values of the random variable) was used for each plot.
Kernel regression with a Gaussian kernel was used to compute the curves.
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Configuration q(x, t) v(x) k T ∆x ∆t
1 xe−t/2 4x(x − 1)(x− 2) 1100 2 1100 160 , 1100 , 1140
2
1−
√
1−4(t−t2)
2−2t 6|x− 12 | − 3 11000 1 1200 1100 , 1200 , 1400
3 0.1 (sin(2pit) + cos(2pix)) x(x− 1) 1100 2 1160 1100 , 1160 , 1200
Table 1: Three configurations of the heat equation.
In the second set of experiments, we corrupt a previous time step data stored in memory.
Error-correcting codes in memory hardware provides a low-level check for faults that corrupt data
in memory, and applications can supplement these with other, perhaps stronger protections, at
some cost; but it is interesting to find whether our approach can detect changes in stored data
independently.
For Runge-Kutta, the relevant stored data is the solution computed at the last time step. For
an LMM, the stored state is a set of several solutions and derivatives at previous time steps.
Figure 4 shows the error detection effectiveness of Runge-Kutta and LMM-based schemes. We
see that the Runge-Kutta A/B schemes have difficulty detecting the errors. At each step of any
Runge-Kutta, the previous solution is the initial condition for advancing to the next time step.
Thus, the difference computation Dn = ‖uBn − uAn ‖ does not necessarily seem out of the ordinary;
Dn is the correct difference for the wrong problem. The change in initial conditions can cause Dn to
be significantly larger than Dn−1, so the detection rates are still modest. With a multistep method,
on the other hand, the previous solution and derivative evaluations need to be correct for Dn to be
the correct difference. Thus, AB45 and AB23 detect these errors effectively; the TPR is quite high
when the error is the result of corrupting stored solution or derivative data.
These results illustrate an advantage of linear multistep methods compared to one-step methods.
It could be argued that a checksum could be used to detect changes to data stored in memory, and
that these could be used in conjunction with one-step A/B schemes for error detection – one can
perform a check on the memory content at each step, before accepting the solution at the next
step. But these schemes cannot detect data corruption due to a bug that stores an incorrect value.
Thus, it is important to be able to detect memory data corruption at the application program, and
multistep schemes appear to do this effectively.
5.3 Heat Equation
We consider the heat equation (Equation (4)) with homogeneous Dirichlet boundary conditions,
for x ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ [0, T ]. The A/B formulations are the Richardson / Crank-Nicolson (R / CN) and
forward / backward Euler (FE/BE) schemes described in Section 3.2. Table 1 describes the three
configurations of the heat equation used in our experiments. For each configuration, we perform
experiments with different time steps.
We consider a trial to be one call to the heat equation solver, which finds a numerical solution at
spatial points 0,∆x, 2∆x, . . . , 1 and temporal points 0,∆t, 2∆t, . . . , T . We inject one fault per trial
at a uniformly random step. For Configuration 1, we corrupt a single component of the function
evaluation of q (σ2 =1e-3 for R/CN and σ2 =1e-1 for FE/BE). For Configuration 2, we corrupt a
single component in the right-hand-side of the implicit schemes’ linear systems (σ2 =1e-6 for R/CN
and σ2 =5e-5 for FE/BE). For Configuration 3, we corrupt a single component of the previous
solution vector (σ2 =1e-6 for R/CN and σ2 =1e-4 for FE/BE). The variances were chosen in order
to generate errors with LTE-normalized error near one. If the variances were much larger, nearly all
errors would be detected and we would not see the relationship between TPR and LTE-normalized
error. Smaller variances were used for R/CN than FE/BE because the same type of corruption is
13
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Figure 4: Detector performance with RK45, RK23, AB45, and AB23 A/B schemes on the Van der Pol
equation. We corrupt the solution from the last time step (or a previous derivative evaluation
in AB23 and AB34) by multiplying one component of the vector by a normal random variable
with mean 1 and variance 1e-1. The corrupted data is stored in memory in the program. The
same sequence of corruption amounts (values of the random variable) were used for each plot.
Kernel regression with a Gaussian kernel was used to compute the curves.
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Figure 5: Detection results for Heat equation under Configuration 1 with dt = 1/60, 1/100, and 1/140.
Faults are injected by multiplying the source term q by a normally distributed random variable
with mean 1 and variance 1e-3 (R/CN) or 1e-1 (FE/BE).
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Figure 6: Detection results for Heat equation under Configuration 2 with dt = 1/100, 1/200, and 1/400.
Faults are injected by multiplying a single random component of the right-hand-side of each
linear equation solve by a normally distributed random variable with mean 1 and variance 1e-6
(R/CN) or 5e-5 (FE/BE).
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Figure 7: Detection results for Heat equation under Configuration 3 with dt = 1/100, 1/160, and 1/200.
Faults are injected by multiplying a single component of the solution at the previous time step
by a normally distributed random variable with mean 1 and variance 1e-6 (Crank-Nicolson /
Richardson) or 1e-4 (backward / forward Euler).
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Figure 8: Detection results for forward / backward Euler on the heat equation under Configuration 2 with
∆t = 1/200. The left and right plots compare using only the relative jump or only the variance
change, respectively, to using both relative jump and variance change. The listed FPR is for using
only the relative jump (left) or only the variance (right). When using both indicators, there are
no false positives. Faults were injected by multiplying a single component of the solution at the
previous time step by a normally distributed random variable with mean 1 and variance 5e-5.
Identical faults were injected for each type of detector.
more easily detected by R/CN. This agrees with the case for the ODE solvers in Section 5.2, where
higher-order A/B schemes had better detection rates.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 plot TPR as a function of the LTE-normalized error. The results illustrate
several important features of the detection scheme. First, errors with a large impact on the solution
(large LTE-normalized error) are much more easily detected than errors with a small impact (small
LTE-normalized error). Second, checking for an error one step after the fault occurs can significantly
improve detection (see especially Figure 5). In Section 5.5, we explore why this is true. Third, the
false positive rate (FPR) is small. In many cases, no false positives are produced. The largest FPR
was only 1.2%. Fourth, we can detect several types of errors. Finally, decreasing the time step
either improves detection rates or keeps the detection rates the same.
We note that the adaptive thresholding, described in Section 4, does not allow for a tradeoff
between better TPR at the cost of a larger FPR or vice versa. In a sense, the adaptive thresholding
approximately finds the sweet spot where any anomaly that can be detected, is detected. However,
there are some anomalies that are so well “disguised”, that they are indistinguishable from normal
iterations, and only by allowing an extreme increase in FPR are we able to detect these.
5.4 Detection indicators for the heat equation
In Equations (5) and (6), we defined the indicators Jn and Vn used by the detector’s two-indicator
strategy. Jn measured the jump in the differences in the sequence, and Vn measured the change in
variance of the differences. We call these the relative jump and the variance change.
We now empirically explore the advantages of the two-indicator strategy over a single detection
indicator. Figure 8 shows the detection results for FE/BE when using only the relative jump and
only the variance change under Configuration 2 of the heat equation with ∆t = 1/200. We used
the same injected faults as in Section 5.3. In other words, Figure 8 shows the performance of the
individual detectors when compared to the two-indicator strategy in Figure 6.
When the two-indicator strategy was used (Figure 6), no false positives were produced. The FPR
increases to 14% when using only the relative jump and to 2% when using only the variance change.
The TPR is only mildly increased when using only the relative jump and is mostly unchanged
when using only the variance change. This suggests that the FPR can be dramatically reduced by
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Figure 9: The left plot shows the infinity-norm difference between forward and backward Euler schemes
under Configuration 1 of the heat equation with ∆t = 1/100. At the step of the fault, there is a
small jump in the difference, while at the step after the fault, there is a large spike. The right
plot shows the component-wise absolute difference of forward and backward Euler solutions at
the time steps before, of, and after the fault occurs. The fault corrupts the source term in the
13-th component, and a clear spike is seen at that location.
employing the two-indicator strategy.
5.5 Tardy error detection with the heat equation
In some configurations of the heat equation, it is common to detect the error one time step after
the fault occurs (see, for example, Figure 5). The left plot of Figure 9 shows Di for the FE/BE
A/B formulation near the point of the injected fault for one of the simulations in which tardy error
detection occurs. The right plot of Figure 9 shows the component-wise difference of the solution
vectors near the time step of the fault (recall that the Di is the infinity-norm difference). We see a
small jump in Di at the step of the fault and a large spike the step after the fault. The jump at the
fault is not big enough for the detector to signal an error. Some of the components of the difference
between backward and forward Euler are naturally larger than others, and the fault occurs at a
spatial location where the differences tend to be small.
Why is the jump larger the step after the fault? In this case, we are corrupting the source term
q in Equation (4). At the fault, only backward Euler uses the corrupted evaluation of q (forward
Euler uses the value of q from the previous time step). The implicit nature of backward Euler
scheme forces the new solution to “agree” with the corrupted source term, and the result is a small
jump in Di. At the step after the fault, forward Euler uses the corrupted source term. Since forward
Euler is explicit, the corrupted value is “accepted” and taken for a full time step. This causes the
large spike in the sequence of Di to occur at the step after the fault.
The right plot of Figure 9 illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of using the infinity-norm.
On one hand, the errors tend to be localized spatially, and local spikes are easier to detect with the
infinity-norm. However, when the solution vector difference has different scales, it is more difficult
to detect faults that occur in spatial locations where the solution vector difference is smaller. In
general, we found that the infinity-norm worked better than the 1-norm and 2-norm. We note that
our general framework does restrict Di to consider only a single norm. However, for simplicity, we
chose a single norm for our experiments. These results show that examing Di locally in space and
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in time can be beneficial, and this is an area of future work.
5.6 Incompressible Navier-Stokes equations
The incompressible Navier-Stokes equations in two dimensions with no external forces are
ut = −(u2)x − (uv)y + 1
Re
∇ · ∇u− px
vt = −(v2)y − (uv)x + 1
Re
∇ · ∇v − py.
Here, u and v are the velocity components, Re is the Reynolds number, and p is the pressure.
In our experiments, B is based on a simple projection method in [Strang, 2007, Section 6.7] and
open-source Matlab code [Seibold, 2008]. The boundary is a square, and the boundary conditions
are those of a driven cavity flow.
Let UnB , V
n
B , and P
n
B be the numerical solutions at the n-th time step and let ∆t be the time
step. The overall structure of the update to UB in an iteration of B is as follows:
1. Explicit (forward Euler like) handling of nonlinear terms:
U∗B − UnB
∆t
= −((UnB )2)x − (UnBV nB )y,
where the subscripts denote centered difference.
2. Implicit solve for viscous term:
U∗∗B − U∗B
∆t
=
1
Re
∇ · ∇U∗∗B (7)
3. Solve for the pressure correction:
∇ · ∇Pn+1B =
1
∆t
(
(U∗∗B )x + (V
∗∗
B )y
)
(8)
4. Update the solution:
Un+1B = U
∗∗
B −∆t(Pn+1B )x (9)
The update to VB follows analogous steps.
For our experiments, we use extrapolation for the auxiliary scheme,
Un+1A = 2U
n
B − Un−1B , V n+1A = 2V nB − V n−1B
along with the difference computation
Dn = max(max
i,j
|(UnB )ij − (UnA)ij |,max
i,j
|(V nB )ij − (V nA )ij |).
There is no restriction for the A/B scheme to encompass the entire numerical method. We could
implement specialized A/B schemes for each of the three steps in addition to or in place of the
extrapolation scheme. An advantage of compartmentalized A/B schemes is that we can detect an
error early in the iteration and avoid doing extra computation. However, extrapolation is simple
and demonstrates that detecting silent errors in a nonlinear PDE system need not involve a lot of
extra work.
Our experiments use the above projection method on the spatial domain [0, 1] × [0, 1] for t ∈
[0, 2]. The discretizations are ∆x = ∆y = 1/40 and ∆t = 1/100. We perform two simulations
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Figure 10: Detector performance on incompressible Navier-Stokes equations with Re = 2000 (left) and
Re = 20 (right). In the left plot, errors are introduced by multiplying a previous entry of the
numerical solution of one velocity component (U) by a normal random variable with mean
1 and variance 5e-1. In the right plot, errors are introduced by multiplying an entry in the
right-hand-side of the linear system in Equation (8) by a normal random variable with mean
1 and variance 2.
with different Reynolds numbers and different types of data corruption. In the first simulation,
Re = 2000, and we corrupt the previous solution, UnB (σ
2 = 5e-1). In the second simulation,
Re = 20, and we corrupt the right-hand-side of the linear system in Equation (8) (σ2 = 2). Each
simulation consisted of 2,000 trials. In each trial, the corruption occured at a single time step,
chosen uniformly at random. The entry in UnB and the entry in the right-hand-side of Equation (8)
were chosen uniformly at random.
The TPR as a function of the LTE-normalized error is in Figure 10. The results are similar to
the behavior of the detector for the Van der Pol equation and the heat equation. Errors with a
large LTE-normalized error are easily detected, and the FPR is small.
6 Discussion
By comparing the results of a base time-stepping scheme and an auxiliary scheme, we are able to
detect almost all significant errors. The auxiliary scheme is readily available for standard ODE
solvers such as Runge-Kutta and linear multistep methods, as well as for PDE solvers for the Heat
equation and the Navier-Stokes equations. In simulations, our detection scheme successfully flags
nearly all LTE-normalized errors above three, while maintaining an overall false positive rate of
less than 10% (and in many cases, 0%). An important property of our detection scheme is that it
is most successful detecting errors that have the largest impact on the solution. We measure the
impact by the LTE-normalized error.
One area of future work is a more formal analysis of the errors in the difference schemes and
the sequence Di. We would like to say that a fault must have occurred if some Di was above a
computed threshold. Typical error bounds are too loose with constants to be practical, so careful
analysis is needed.
Further characterizations of silent errors is another area of future work. First, it would be useful
to detect what caused the fault. We can use data checksums to determine whether a previous
solution was corrupted, but determining if a function evaluation caused an error is more difficult.
Second, we would like to know where the fault occurred. For example, when perturbing an
entry in the source term of the heat equation (the function q), the heat is dissipated locally near
the spatial point of perturbation. The solution vector is then perturbed near (in space) to where
21
the source term was perturbed. We saw this phenomenon in Figure 9, and it led to tardy error
detection, which we discussed in Section 5.5. Thus, it is possible to detect where (physically) the
fault occurred. This is important for two reasons. First, we can improve the performance of our
error detector if we look for errors in space and time. Second, in parallel solvers, it is common for
different spatial locations to be assigned to different processors. By detecting the point in space
where the fault occurred, we have an idea of which processor experienced a silent error. In other
physical simulations where perturbations cause local changes, we can apply the same idea.
The spatial location of the error is also potentially important in improving the sensitivity of the
detector. As shown in Figure 9, it is possible that detectors that are local in both space and time
may be a profitable extension of the approach taken here.
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